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Between June 1937 and November 1938, the Red Army was subjected to a major purge, which 
spread from an attack on the officer corps to the rank and file. Its full extent is difficult to 
calculate, but an estimated 35,000 military leaders were removed from the ranks, thousands 
were arrested and many executed. The devastation and disruption this wrought on the Red 
Army has often been cited as factor in the Red Army’s disastrous military performance in the 
months following the German invasion in June 1941. Understanding and explaining why Stalin 
unleashed a campaign so damaging to the Red Army’s combat performance and the Soviet 
Union’s security has long occupied historians. Yet, despite the effort to re-examine the history 
of the Great Terror in the 1980s and 1990s the military purge has not, until now, undergone a 
thorough re-interpretation. On the basis of new archival evidence, drawn from the Russian 
State Military Archive (RGVA) and the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History 
(RGASPI), including Stalin’s personal papers, The Red Army and the Great Terror offers an 
important re-examination of this remarkable episode in political and military history. 
 Over the course of six carefully constructed chapters, Whitewood examines how 
anxieties about the political loyalty of the Red Army evolved and shifted over the twenty years 
from 1917 to 1937. Chapter 1 details how the Red Army was perceived by the Bolshevik party 
and security organs as a target for infiltration by the state’s enemies. Concerns about the Red 
Army’s internal security, as Chapter 2 demonstrates, continued long after the Civil War. 
Rumours and suspicion remained influential, even though these anxieties had little foundation 
in reality. Chapter 3 focuses on a period of crisis in the early 1930s, when a perceived foreign-
backed conspiracy in the upper levels of the Red Army coincided with a period of growing 
discontent amongst the rank and file because of the collectivisation of agriculture. Although 
the Red Army experienced the early to mid-1930s as a period of relative calm, as Chapter 4 
examines, the wider political atmosphere deteriorated as Stalin gained greater control. By 1936 
many doubts remained about whether all potential enemies had been purged from the army, 
but there was little indication that a purge would spread beyond removing suspected 
Trotskyists. In Chapter 5, the focus shifts to mapping the intricate pattern of events that pushed 
Stalin and the political police to launch a military purge in 1937. A final chapter explores the 
connection between the fallout of the military purge, and the start of mass operations targeting 
suspect population groups. 
 Whitewood argues that Stalin attacked the Red Army because he perceived a serious 
security threat within it, rather than out a desire to enforce total control of the dysfunctional 
Soviet system. ‘In this respect,’ as he writes, ‘Stalin launched the military purge from a position 
of vulnerability and misperception rather than from a position of confidence and strength.’ (pp. 
13–14). In pursuing this argument, he guides the reader through the historiographical 
controversies that have surrounded interpretations of the Great Terror. This study also advances 
an original explanation for the mass operations, the high point of the terror, which extended 
the purge beyond the political elite. Although the preconditions existed for mass repression to 
mushroom in the mid-1930s it was the military purge which acted as a trigger to launch a purge 
of wider society in the summer of 1937. Having discovered a military-fascist plot within the 
Red Army, the political police were encouraged to perceive foreign backed conspiracies in 
other Soviet institutions and the ordinary population. Having revealed how vulnerable one of 
the pillars of Soviet order appeared to be to foreign infiltration, population groups perceived as 
dangerous or unreliable began to be targeted.  
The Red Army and the Great Terror deserves to be read widely. Scholars hoping to 
learn more about how the military purge affected the Red Army’s command structures, combat 
performance, and morale on the eve of an impending war, may need to look elsewhere. 
Whitewood, however, succeeds in his aim of placing the purge into the wider context of 
political repression in the 1930s. Indeed, he does this so successfully that in addition to 
advancing a new interpretation of the military purge, the book also serves as a valuable 
introduction to the dynamics of purge and terror beyond the armed forces. Whitewood writes 
clearly and accessibly, allowing the reader to follow the complexities of Stalin’s 
misperceptions about the threats posed by suspect elements within the Red Army, the 
suspicions of the political police, and the forces that expanded the purge far beyond Marshal 
Tukhachevskii and the officers linked to the former political opposition. Anybody interested 
Soviet civil-military relations between the Revolution and the Second World War will learn a 
great deal from reading this meticulously researched study. 
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